Abstract-Component importance analysis is to measure the effect on system reliability of component reliabilities, and it can be used to the design of system from the reliability point of view. In this paper, we consider the component importance analysis of real-time computing systems in the presence of common-cause failures (CCFs) (i.e., failure dependencies). Although the CCFs are known as a risk factor of degradation of system reliability, it is difficult to evaluate the component importance measures in the presence of CCFs analytically. This paper introduces a continuous-time Markov chain (CTMC) model for real-time computing system, and applies the CTMC-based component-wise sensitivity analysis which can evaluate the component importance measures without any structure function of system. Also, in numerical experiments, we evaluate the effect of CCFs by the comparison of system performance measures and component importance in the case of system with CCFs with those in the case that there is no CCF in the system.
I. INTRODUCTION Nowadays, real-time computing systems are widely used in our daily lives, e.g., anti-lock braking system (ABS) in cars, telephone networks, and patient care systems. A realtime computing system is a system in which timeliness is as important as correctness of its outputs [1] . A delayed output in real-time systems is not acceptable even if it has a correct value. Thus, the reliability of these systems is more important. To obtain the high reliability of system, it is necessary to ensure that the critical components in the system are operational with high reliability.
To detect the critical components in the system, the sensitivity analysis is effective. The sensitivity analysis is a method to estimate the magnitude of deviations of performance indices when system configuration changes. Generally, the parametric sensitivity is considered, which is the first derivatives of performance indices with respect to model parameters. The parametric sensitivity can also be applied to optimizing system performance by combining the mathematical programming as well as the evaluation of effects on parameters. Nevertheless, in the reliability engineering, the component importance analysis is more preferred than the parametric sensitivity analysis. The component importance analysis, called the componentwise sensitivity analysis, is to estimate the first derivatives of reliability measures of system with respect to reliability measures of components. Thus the component importance analysis can detect the critical components from the reliability point of view directly.
On the other hand, the system failure is often caused by the dependent failures among components in practice, such as the common-cause failures (CCFs). The CCF is defined as any condition or event that affects several components inducing their simultaneous failure or malfunction [2] , and is synonymous with the simultaneous failures and multiple failures. In fact, the dependent failure is known as a risk factor of the degradation of system reliability, and makes it difficult to evaluate the component importance measures analytically. In the past, some researches considered the real-time computing systems with failure dependencies. For example, Fricks et al. [2] studied the effect of failure dependencies in a real-time computing system using stochastic Petri nets (SPNs) and continuous-time Markov chains (CTMCs). Also, they classified some different types of failure dependencies that can arise in the reliability model of real-time computing system, and illustrate how several of the failure dependencies can be incorporated in SPN model. Based on their research, it is realized that failure dependencies highly influence the system reliability and that failure dependencies therefore never should be ignored.
Also, in [3] , Fricks et al. considered three kinds of component importance measures for Markov chains by using structure function which represents the relationship between components failures and system failure, and can be obtained using symbolic analytical logic techniques such as fault tree (FT) and reliability block diagram (RBD) analysis. Pan et al. [4] presented a quantitative method to evaluate the importance of each CCF event. More precisely, they divided the CCFs into two groups; one with a clear relationship between the causes and effects and the other with no such relationship. For the first group of CCFs, they evaluate the structure function importance and probability importance of the common root cause events modeled using FT. On the other hand, they considered the Birnbaum importance for the second group of CCFs which are achieved by using parametric model. Moreover, Zheng et al. [5] applied a novel component-wise sensitivity analysis to derive the availability upgrading functions under which components are statistically independent and described by general CTMCs. In their paper, the presented method can derive the component importance measures only from a CTMC model without any structure function of system.
In this paper, we evaluate the component importance measures of a real-time computing system in the presence of CCFs, which are caused only when several processing units share a common software module and known as the factor of the degradation of system reliability. Thus it is important to evaluate the effect of CCFs even in the real-time computing system. Concretely, this paper considers a real-time computing system which is represented by hybrid model consisting of RBD and CTMCs. The RBD is top level description for the system that illustrates how components and subsystem reliabilities contribute to the success or failure of a system. The RBD allow us to model the failure relationships of complex systems, but cannot be used to describe the dynamic reliability behavior of systems. On the other hand, the CTMC can well describe the dynamic behaviors of system, and is used to model three subsystems in the real-time computing system. Based on these models, we evaluate three kinds of importance measures represented in [3] by using the classical method with structure functions. Moreover, the importance measures can be computed by using the component-wise sensitivity analysis [5] in the case of CCFs.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II introduces the real-time computing system presented in [2] . In particular, we model the failure relationships of system using RBD, and describe three subsystems modeled by CTMCs. In Section III, we evaluate the system availability and reliability from structure functions and CTMC analysis respectively. In Section IV, we evaluate three kinds of importance measures based on structure functions and CTMC-based componentwise sensitivity analysis. Section V is devoted to numerical experiments. Concretely, we compute the importance measures from structure function in the case where there is no CCF in the system. For the system with CCFs case, we use the CTMC-based component-wise sensitivity analysis. Finally, we conclude this paper with some remarks in Section VI.
II. REAL-TIME COMPUTING SYSTEM
Consider the real-time computing system in [2] as shown in Fig. 1 . In the system, there are three processing modules (PMs), two shared memories (SMs), and two digital switches (DSs). The processing modules are implemented by a pairand-a-spare fault-tolerant scheme [6] , each consisting of processor(s), cache and local memories, power source, interface drives, and control circuitry. On the other hand, the parallel redundancy schemes are adopted to operate all the other critical system components (e.g., shared memories, input/output (I/O) bus, and digital switches). The communication among these processing modules is performed through shared memories where each processing module can read and store values, and the data transfer is achieved by using a parallel interconnecion bus. Additionally, the I/O bus interconnects the processing modules to external interface devices, and the Analog-toDigital (A/D) and Digital-to-Analog (D/A) converters are connected directly to a dual I/O bus to provide redundant data/control path to the processing modules. Digital switches broadcast all data received from the I/O bus to all processing modules simultaneously.
Moreover, there is a control module in the system, which is responsible for selecting which of the online processor modules effectively controls the physical process. And the digital switches enforce the directives of the control module, that is, all processor modules may receive data from the physical process at any time, but only one can send control signals to the process.
In this paper, we assume that the pair-and-a-spare configuration is implemented by a hot standby sparing scheme, where two processor modules operate online in synchrony, and a spare module runs simultaneously with the pair modules but will not process data or requests. However, data is mirrored in real time, thus both processor modules have identical data. Upon failure of the pair modules, the spare one immediately takes over, replacing the pair modules. Fig. 2 shows the RBD of the real-time computing system. As seen in this figure, the system is divided into three subsystems: PM, SM, and DS subsystems. The system is considered operational as long as there is one operational critical component in each subsystem: processor module, shared memory, and digital switch. Also, we assume that there is a single infallible repair station for each component.
A. Subsystem Models
In [2] , the behaviors of all subsystems are described by CTMCs which are commonly used to represent the variations caused by failures and repairs of components in the system structure. Particularly, we consider the CCFs in PM subsystem. 
1) Common-Cause Failure (CCF):
As mentioned before, the CCF is defined as any condition or event that affects several components inducing their simultaneous failure or malfunction. Generally, there are three types of common-cause failures, that is (i) human errors, which can result in damage to equipment and property or disruption of scheduled operations of the system; (ii) system environment, including the characteristics of the environment where the system operates and the natural factors such as earthquake, fire, and flood; and (iii) intercomponent, which means that the failure of a component may affect adversely other components as a result of a chain reaction or domino effect. This paper focuses on the intercomponent failure dependency model by using parametric approach. Concretely, we consider the beta factor introduced by Fleming [7] . The beta factor β gives the probability that a failure in a specific component causes all components to fail, and 1 − β gives the probability that the failure will involve just the component. Suppose that λ i is the rate of independent failure killing single component, and λ d is the rate of dependent failures killing all components. Then the overall failure rate λ of a particular component can be written as the sum of independent and dependent failure contributions:
Thus the β is defined as the fraction of the total failure rate attributable to dependent failures:
Dissimilar components may have different failure rates and different beta factors.
2) PM Subsystem:
The CTMC of PM subsystem is depicted in Fig. 3 . In this figure, white and gray nodes represent operational and failure states respectively. Table I shows Table II . For example, 1/λ p1 is mean time to failure (MTTF) of PM1, and then λ p1 is a failure rate which is a transition rate in the CTMC. For three dissimilar components PM, we assume that they have the same beta factor β which gives the probability that a failure in one component causes all components to fail. As seen in Fig. 3 , the simultaneous failures of all PMs and two PMs are highlighted by bold and red transitions. 3) SM and DS Subsystems: Assume that there is no CCF in SM and DS subsystems. Then we have the 4-state CTMC models represented in Fig. 4 for SM and DS subsystems. In this figure, the state notations are given in the same manner as the PM subsystem, and shown in Table III . The parameters of the 4-state CTMC models are also given in Table II . 
III. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

A. Structure Function
The structure function is a binary function that indicates the state of the system (success or failure) given the state of each component [8] . Given the structure function of a system, we can compute its reliability. In general, the structure function can be derived from FT and RBD.
Let
) be the state vector of real-time computing system, and the k-th element of x is a binary variable which represents the condition of component k, k ∈ {P M1, P M2, P M3, SM1, SM2, DS1, DS2};
The structure function represents the relationship between component failures and system failure. In general, the structure function is defined by
For example, consider a system consisting of K components. If the system is a series system, namely, the system failure occurs when any component fails, the structure function is given by
If the system failure occurs only when all the components fail, so-called parallel system, then the structure function is given below,
According to the RBD in Fig. 2 , we obtain the structure function of real-time computing system as follow,
Let P x (t) be a certain probability mass function of the system being in state x at time t. Then the reliability function of system can be computed by
where Ω is the state space of the system as shown in Table IV . Note that in this table, R k (t) indicates the reliability of component k at time t.
On the other hand, the availability function of system is given by
where P x = lim t−>∞ P x (t) when considering the repair for the component failures. Using Eq. (8), we have the system reliability function R S (t);
where, in general R k (t) = 1 − R k (t). In practice, the above equation is often called the structure function which represents the effect of component reliability on the system reliability. Then we define the steady-state availability of component k as A k . Similarly, we obtain the structure function for the system availability A S :
where
B. CTMC Analysis
Let Q P M , Q SM , Q DS be the infinitesimal generators of CTMC for PM , SM, and DS subsystems, respectively. Then we have the composite CTMC generator for the real-time computing system by using the tensor sum of matrices as [9] 
Generally, in the availability modeling of CTMC, the states of system can be classified into two sets; U, the set of up (operational) states in which the system is available; and D, the set of down (failed) states in which the system is unavailable. We define U k and D k as the sets of states where the component k is up or down, respectively. Also, U S and D S are the sets 
of states where the system is up or down. Then the reward vectors for component k and system can be defined by
and
respectively, where [·] i means the i-th element of a vector. Using the reward vectors, the steady-state availabilities for component k and system are
where π ss is the steady-state vector which can be computed by the following linear equations:
where 1 is a column vector whose elements are 1.
On the other hand, if the underlying CTMC does not have transitions from D k to U k and from D S to U S , the reliability functions of component k and system are given by
where π(t) is the state probability vector which is given by
in which π(0) is a given initial probability vector.
IV. COMPONENT IMPORTANCE ANALYSIS
A. Birnbaum Importance Measure
Birnbaum [10] defined the component importance from the reliability point of view. In [10] , the component importance is defined by the first derivative of system reliability function with respect to the component reliability:
Let δ k (x) be the first derivative of structure function with respect to the state condition of component k:
Integrating Eqs. (8) and (20) into Eq. (19), then Birnbaum importance becomes
Thus, we can compute the Birnbaum availability and reliability component importance measures (AIB and RIB) which are written by
In general, we compute the RIB by using the first derivative of system reliability with respect to the component reliability after obtaining the system reliability structure function as in Eq. (10). The AIB can be computed by the same manner. 1) Case I: system without CCFs: Suppose that there is no CCF in the real-time computing system, that is, all components are statistically independent, and we delete the bold and red transitions in the CTMC of PM subsystem. Thus the sensitivities of system performance index with respect to component performance indices can be obtained from the structure function analytically. For example, for the component PM1 in the system without CCFs, then using Eq. (11), the Birnbaum availability importance of component PM1 becomes
where the availability of each component can be computed by
Similarly, the Birnbaum reliability component importance measure RIB k (t) can also be obtained from structure func-tion. For example, the Birnbaum reliability importance of component PM1 is given by
in which, the reliability of each component is computed from
2) Case II: system with CCFs: However, in practice, the system failure often occurs due to the CCFs. For example, the real-time computing system where the intercomponent dependent failures occur among the components in PM subsystem as seen in Fig. 3 . In such case, we cannot obtain the above sensitivities from structure function analytically. Then we consider the component-wise sensitivity analysis [5] , which can be used to compute ∂A S /∂A k and ∂R S (t)/∂R k directly based on Markov chains. Concretely, for the realtime computing system with components PM1, PM2, PM3, SM1, SM2, DS1, and DS2, and model parameter vector θ = (θ 1 , . . . , θ m ), we compute
. . .
In the case of steady-state analysis, these sensitivities can be obtained by solving the following linear equations:
where s ss (θ j ) = ∂ ∂θj π ss . By using the vector s ss (θ j ), the sensitivities are given by
In the transient case, we have
Then the following ordinary differential equation (ODE) is obtained,
By integrating Eq. (31) into the above ODE, we have
Since the diagonal elements ofQ(θ j ) are same as those of Q S , we can apply the uniformization to the following matrix exponential form:
Then the estimates of AIB = (AIB P M1 , . . . , AIB DS2 ) T and RIB(t) = (RIB P M1 (t), . . . , RIB DS2 (t)) T are given by
B. Criticality Importance Measure
The criticality measure was proposed by Henley et al. [11] which means the probability that, when the system fails, the failure of component k becomes a cause of the system failure. They defined the criticality importance of component k as a fractional sensitivity given by
where F k (t) and F S (t) are the unreliability functions of component k and system at time t respectively, and given by
Similarly, according to [12] , the Eq. (39) can be represented by the reliability functions of system and component, ie.,
Thus, the criticality importance measures of availability and reliability (AICF and RICF) from the unreliability point of view can be derived by
where F k = 1 − A k , and F S = 1 − A S . Also, according to Eq. (41), we obtain the criticality importance measures of availability and reliability (AICR and RICR) from the viewpoint of reliability given by
Essentially, these measures can be computed from AIB k and RIB k (t), i.e.,
(47)
C. Upgrading function
The upgrading function is the parametric sensitivity function with respect to a failure rate [3] . According to the definition, we have the availability and reliability upgrading functions (AIU and RIU) for component k:
where λ k and μ k are failure and repair rates of component k. Note that AIU can also be defined for the repair rate. The AIU is essentially same as the availability importance measures discussed by Cassady et al. [13] . In [13] and [14] , they assumed that components are independent and that the component has only two states, up and down on the underlying CTMC. On the other hand, Zheng et al. [5] introduced the method to derive the availability upgrading functions under which components are described by general CTMCs. The idea of their approach is to apply the aggregation technique [15] . However, even in [5] , components are assumed to be independent. In this paper, by applying the sensitivity estimation and aggregation, we derive AIUs and RIU for MRMs.
First we consider AIUs. The aggregation is a technique to reduce MRM-based availability models to the 2-state model which has the same availability as the original model. When we focus on the state of one component, the states can be classified to U k and D k . The aggregation technique converts the original model to the 2-state model with transitions from up to down states and up to down state. By applying this technique, we obtain failure and repair rates in steady state that ensure the steady-state probabilities of the up (down) states are the same as those in the original model. In this paper, these failure and repair rates are called equivalent failure and repair rates [15] .
From the argument of CTMC, equivalent failure and repair rates of component k can be computed as follows.
where Q is a generator matrix, and [·] i,j is an (i, j)-entry of a matrix. By taking account of
Similarly, AIU k,μ becomes
Next we consider RIU. In this case, the equivalent failure rate cannot be computed. Instead of the equivalent failure rate, we use the time-dependent failure rate, i.e., λ k (t) = −(dR k (t)/dt)/(1 − R k (t)). Generally, the relationship between reliability function and failure rate is given by
Based on this failure rate, RIU can be obtained by
In the Markov chain, the failure rate of component k is
V. NUMERICAL ILLUSTRATION
In this section, we illustrate the quantitative component analysis of real-time computing system. Concretely, we compute the importance measures using structure function in the case where there is no CCF in the system. On other hand, for the system with CCFs case, the CTMC-based component-wise sensitivity analysis is applied. Based on the results, we evaluate the effect of CCFs on system performance measures and component importance. Table V shows the model parameters. 
Params
Description
A. System without CCFs
Before considering the real-time computing system with CCFs, we first evaluate the component importance measures of the system without CCFs by using structure function. That is, we consider the CTMC of PM subsystem without bold and red transitions. According to the RBD analysis, we obtain the same structure functions for the system availability and reliability as in Eqs. (11) and (10) , and the availabilities and reliabilities of subsystems and system at time t = 60 hours are given in Table VI . From the table, we find that both the availability and reliability of PM subsystem are the highest, and approximately equals 1 because of the pair-and-a-spare fault-tolerant scheme. Tables VII and VIII show the availabilities and availability importance measures (AIB, AICR, AICF, and AIU), and reliabilities and reliability importance measures (RIB, RICR, RICF, and RIU) at time t = 60 hours of each component, respectively. As seen in these tables, the availabilities and reliabilities of PMs are relatively higher, compared to the other components, since the failure rates of PMs are relatively lower. From Table VII , we find that in each subsystem, the component with lower failure rate has higher importance measures AIB, AICR, and AIU. The same result appears in the reliability importance measures RIB, RICR, and RIU shown in Table VIII . This is caused by the fact that the failure of a high-reliability component always decreases the system reliability largely in the redundancy system in a parallel configuration. Note that ICF k (t) is another criticality measure defined by the unreliability function that quantifies the probability of component k being responsible for system failure before t hours. For example, in Table VIII , RICF SM 1 (60) says that there is a 84.45% probability of component SM1 being responsible for system failure before 60 hours. Moreover, RICF P M1 (60) indicates that the probability of component PM1 being responsible for system failure before 60 hours is only 00.18%. This implies that component SM1 is more important than component PM1, since a component that is frequently critical should be considered important. Moreover, we find that the ICFs for components in the same subsystem are almost the same. Tables IX and X illustrate the importance ranking of system components according to distinct measures. From these tables, we find that the importance rankings in steady-state and transition state (t = 60 hours) are the same, and there is consistency in the ranking of components for three measures (IB, ICR, and IU). The components SM1 and SM2 are more important than the other components, because their importance measures are relatively higher (see Tables VII and VIII) . This indicates that the improvement of failure rates of SMs is more efficient to enhance the system availability and reliability, since the component most susceptible to failures is the natural candidate for improvement. In addition, these tables imply that the component PM is not critical, compared to the other components, benefiting from the hot standby sparing configuration and long MTTF (see Table V ). 
B. System with CCFs
Next we focus on the case where there are CCFs in PM subsystem (see Fig. 3 ). The component-wise sensitivity analysis is applied to compute the importance measures based on CTMCs, and the results are shown in from Table XI to XIII. Table XI presents the availabilities and reliabilities at time t = 60 hours. Compared to the availabilities and reliabilities in Table VI , the system availability and reliability become smaller, because the availability and reliability of PM subsystem decrease due to the dependent failures among PMs. Moreover, Tables XII and XIII present the availabilities and availability importance measures (AIB, AICR, AICF, and AIU), and reliabilities and reliability importance measures (RIB, RICR, RICF, and RIU) at time t = 60 hours of each component in the case where there are some CCFs in the system. From these tables, it is found that the importance of each component PM increases sharply due to the CCFs, especially the importance measures regarding the system availability. In fact, the dependent failures also decrease the availability and reliability of each component PM, since the time-dependent failure rate of each component PM increases caused by the dependent failures (see Table XIV ). On the other hand, the availabilities and reliabilities of the other components (e.g., SMs and DSs) remain the same because any failure in the PM subsystem cannot cause the simultaneous failure of components in the other subsystems. However, these tables also indicate that the importance of components SMs and DSs is slightly affected by the dependent failures among PMs, and decreases. For example, from Table XIII , RICF SM1 (60) says that the probability of component SM1 being responsible for system failure before 60 hours is 81.48%, which is smaller than that in the case of system without CCFs (see Table VIII ).
We then investigate the importance ranking of components in the case where simultaneous failures occur in the PM subsystem. Tables XV and XVI show the importance rankings of system components in steady-state and transition state (t = 60 hours), respectively. From Table XV , we find that the ranking of components SMs still remains the same, however the importance (AIB and AICR) of each component PM increases and becomes larger than that of components DSs in the case of system with CCFs, compared to Table IX . When considering AIU, we find that in the PM subsystem, the component with lower failure rate has lower importance, that is, component PM3 is the most important one, followed by component PM2, and finally component PM1. This can be explained by the fact that there is the smallest reduction in the failure probability of the system when the failure rate of component PM1 is reduced fractionally, in other words, components PM2 and PM3 are more critical to system failure by the comparison to component PM1, since there are two reasons; (i) the failure of each component PM probably causes all components to fail (i.e., system failure); and (ii) the failure rate of PM1 is the smallest in three PMs, thus the probability that the system failure is caused by component PM1 is also the smallest. From the viewpoint of reliability, we can conclude the same mark (see RIU in Table XVI ). In addition, Table XVI indicates that the dependent failures do not affect the importance ranking of components in cases of RIB and RICR from the reliability point of view.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have quantitatively evaluated the component importance measures of a real-time computing system [2] where CCFs occur. Concretely, we evaluated three kinds of importance measures in the case of system without CCFs using the structure function based method, and in the case of system with CCFs using component-wise sensitivity analysis based on CTMCs, respectively. When considering the system without CCFs, the above two methods can applied to compute the important measures. However, the structure function based method does not hold in the case where PM1  5  5  7  PM2  6  6  6  PM3  7  7  5  SM1  1  1  1  SM2  2  2  2  DS1  3  3  3  DS2  4  4  4 components are dependent. In such case, the component-wise sensitivity analysis [5] is adopted. In numerical experiments, we illustrated the quantitative importance measures of all components, and ranked the components according to distinct importance measures. Also, we considered the effect of failure dependencies. In future, we intend to improve the Markov chain-based component-wise sensitivity analysis so that it can be applied to solve more complicated Markov models.
ACKNOWLEDGMENT The first author would like to thank the China Scholarship Council (CSC) for the financial support.
